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The Private Provision of International Impure 








We discuss a tax-transfer scheme that aims at addressing the under-provision problem 
associated with the private supply of international public goods and at bringing about 
Pareto optimal allocations internationally. In particular, we consider the example of the 
global public good ‘climate stabilisation’, both in an analytical and a numerical simulation 
model. The proposed scheme levies Pigouvian taxes globally, while international side-
payments are employed in order to provide incentives to individual countries for not taking 
a free-ride from the international Pigouvian tax scheme. The side-payments, in turn, are 
financed via the environmental taxes. As a distinctive feature we take into account ancillary 
benefits  that may be  associated with local public characteristics of climate policy. We 
determine the positive impact that ancillary effects may exert on the scope for financing 
side-payments via environmental taxation. A particular attractive feature of ancillary 
benefits is that they arise shortly after the implementation of climate policies and therefore 
yield an almost immediate payback of investments in abatement efforts. Especially in times 
of high public debt levels, long periods of amortisation would tend to reduce political 
support for investments in climate policy. 
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1  Introduction 
The under-provision of global public goods poses a big challenge, since no 
international coercive authority exists which might enforce an efficient supply of 
the goods in question. Effective  schemes inducing individual countries to 
voluntarily bring about  a Pareto-efficient provision of such goods are sorely 
needed. This becomes apparent when we take a look at the current efforts to 
combat global warming, i.e. to provide the global public good ‘climate 
protection’. The Kyoto Protocol limiting the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of 
most industrialized countries will expire by end of 2012 and the international 
community is encountering large difficulties in agreeing upon an adequate post-
Kyoto regime.  
In general, two different strategies for negotiating and designing a future 
international climate protection regime can be distinguished: Firstly, as in the 
past and with the Kyoto Protocol, countries can – as a first step – negotiate fixed 
GHG abatement targets, e.g. the EU-15 had committed to reduce its emissions 
by 8 per cent in the period 1990-2008/12. Then – as a second step – committed 
countries launch national environmental programmes to attain their individual 
abatement targets. During the commitment  period  of the  Kyoto Protocol, 
countries have employed amongst others price-influencing instruments, like 
emission trading or carbon taxes, in order to pursue their individual Kyoto 
targets.  
Secondly and alternatively, in order to address the inefficient under-provision of 
public goods, the manipulation of prices can be pursued directly at the 
international negotiation stage by stipulating an agreement which itself evokes 
such manipulations. Hence, instead of negotiating and arranging absolute 
abatement targets in an international agreement, countries negotiate the ways 
in which prices are modified. The aim is to agree upon the parameters of such 
manipulations so as to bring about an efficient outcome of the private provision 
of public goods by individual countries. Put it differently, the manipulated 
prices should induce – still selfishly acting – individual governments to behave 
in a way that is compatible with global welfare maximization. It is such 
international price-influencing schemes we are interested in. 3 
 
In recent years several different price-influencing schemes have been proposed 
as a tool for international climate policy. Barrett (1990), Rübbelke (2006), 
Boadway, Song and Tremblay (2007, 2011)  and Fujita (2011)  suggested 
applyingmatching schemes in order to address the inefficiency in global climate 
protection.By matching, which is an approach that was first proposed by 
Guttman (1978, 1987), governments negotiate about so-called matching rates, 
i.e. rates at which they -  conditionally on other countries’ contributions - 
provide additional climate protection efforts. In this way, governments mutually 
subsidize climate policy. As Buchholz, Cornes and Rübbelke (2011) 
demonstrate, these matching schemes are equivalent to so-called tax-subsidy 
schemes, which have been proposed, e.g. by Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996) as 
well as Falkinger (1996). In particular, Falkinger, Hackl and Pruckner (1996) 
suggest applying these schemes to induce an efficient private provision of public 
goods in the sphere of international climate protection. Due to the subsidization 
within matching or tax-subsidy schemes, the effective price or marginal cost of 
climate protection is reduced  so that it becomes more attractive for 
governments to contribute to the public good ‘global  climate 
protection/stabilisation’.    
In the price-influencing nature somehow related to such schemes, Nordhaus 
(2006) recommends implementing a global Pigouvian tax scheme and 
employing side-payments in order to provide incentives for all countries to 
participate in this global scheme. Altemeyer-Bartscher, Rübbelke and 
Sheshinski (2010) have recently elaborated on how this scheme could be 
implemented internationally. Their scheme deviates from matching and tax-
subsidy schemes in the way that it explicitly distinguishes two distinct layers of 
involved agents: governments and private agents (households in their model). 
Governments negotiate tax rates as well as  international side-payments, but 
since the international transfers are provided in a lump-sum fashion, they do 
not experience modifications of the marginal cost of climate policy. Yet, 
becausecountries directly negotiate tax rates,they influence the price of GHG 
emitting activities in the subordinate private household sector. Environmental 
taxation raises the cost of polluting activities and therefore provides additional 
incentives for households to reduce emissions.  4 
 
In this paper we focus on a generalisation of the proposal by Altemeyer-
Bartscher, Rübbelke and Sheshinski (ARS) (2010) which is based on Nordhaus’ 
(2006) Pigouvian tax approach. In contrast to the ARS approach, we take into 
account that climate policy is a global impure public and not a pure public 
good. 1
 
 Impure publicness results from the fact that, apart from climate 
stabilisation which is purely public on a global scale, climate policy is also 
associated with local ancillary benefits such as a reduction of air pollution, 
traffic congestion, or noise (see e.g. OECD 2000 and IPCC 2001). We investigate 
whether and how the occurrence of these privatising features, i.e. the ancillary 
effects which represent private effects from a whole region’s or country’s point 
of view, of climate policy affect the functioning of international climate 
negotiations on environmental taxation. In addition to an analytical assessment 
of the problem, we also investigate the influence of ancillary benefits on the 
functionality of the proposed scheme in a numerical simulation model.  
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we distinguish the main features 
of primary and ancillary benefits of climate policy. Thereafter, in Section 3, we 
present the basic set-up of the analytical model, which we employ in Section 4 to 
depict international negotiations on environmental tax rates and side-
payments. Side-payments are financed via the tax revenue obtained from the 
environmental tax and climate policy is treated as an impure public good. In 
Section 5, in a numerical simulation model we ascertain the potential influence 
ancillary effects might exert on environmental tax revenues and hence on 
available funds for international transfers. Tax revenues tend to increase due to 
ancillary effects as long as the price elasticity of demand for consuming the 
polluting good is not very high. Concerning this matter empirical literature 
provides evidence for a rather price-inelastic demand for gasoline (Brons et al. 
2008), for example. Section 6 draws conclusions and puts our results in a 
broader context. As we will discuss, not only the magnitude of benefits might be 
important for decision-makers, but also the inter-temporal distribution of costs 
and benefits of policies.  
                                                        
1On impure public goods also see Cornes and Sandler (1994, 1996). Impure public goods in the 
context of environmental protection have recently been discussed, e.g. by Rübbelke (2003) and 
Kotchen (2005, 2006). 5 
 
2  Primary and Ancillary Benefits 
Benefits of climate policy arise from the prevention of economic and 
environmental damages. Two different kinds of benefits, i.e. primary and 
ancillary benefits, are produced simultaneously. Primary benefits are the 
benefits derived from pursuing climate policy’s primary aim, which is climate 
stabilization (Markandya and Rübbelke 2004). In contrast to primary benefits, 
the ancillary benefits are, according to the IPCC (2001), “the monetized 
secondary, or side benefits of mitigation policies on problems such as reductions 
in local air pollution associated with the reduction of fossil fuels, and possibly 
indirect effects on congestion, land quality, employment, and fuel security.” We 
distinguish primary and ancillary benefits with respect to two of their main 




Climate-threatening consumption like the burning of fossil fuels regularly has 
three different characteristics or effects: a private effect to the individual 
consumer and two negative externalities of which one is global, while the other 
is more domestic from an individual country’s point of view (see Figure 1).  
Private effect to the consumer: A private household obtains some private 
benefit from burning fossil fuels, e.g. because it might allow the household 
members to travel by car or heat the home.  
Global externalities: By emitting GHGs, this burning also contributes to climate 
destabilization, i.e. global warming, which in turn generates costs globally. 
These costs could be mitigated by policies stabilizing the climate and the 
respective prevented costs are tagged as ‘primary benefits’.  These benefits can 
be enjoyed everywhere in the world, i.e. the merits from climate stabilization are 
non-excludable; furthermore, there is non-rivalry in the consumption of these 
merits. Consequently, ‘climate stabilization’ is a global public effect of climate 
policy. 
Local/regional externalities: In general, climate threatening activities like the 
burning of fossil fuels are not only accompanied by GHG emissions but also by 
the discharge of local or regional air pollutants like particulate matter or sulfur 6 
 
dioxide. Therefore, climate policies like carbon taxes, e.g. causing the mitigation 
of fossil fuel consumption, also improve local or regional air quality. The related 
benefits are coined ‘ancillary benefits’ or ‘co-benefits’, which regularly arise 
locally or regionally in the direct neighborhood of the place where the climate 
protection activity was accomplished.2 Hence, it is appropriate to consider the 
co-effect of air-quality improvement as a domestic public effect from the climate 
protecting country’s or region’s point of view.3
 
 
Figure 1:  Joint Production of Private, Domestic and Global 
Characteristics. 
                                                        
2Longo, Hoyos and Markandya (2011) assess the willingness to pay (WTP) for ancillary and global 
benefits of climate protection policies in the Basque Country/Spain and their results show that 
WTP estimates are 53–73% higher when ancillary benefits are considered. 
3This assumption is a simplification in the sense that some regional pollutants also spill over 
beyond national borders. For an analysis of sulfur emissions as transnational pollutants, see e.g. 
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Inter-temporal occurrence 
Besides the difference in the geographical impact between primary and ancillary 
benefits, there is another important distinction to be made: the intervals 
between the implementation of a climate policy, like a carbon tax, andthe 
occurrence of benefits differ among primary and ancillary benefits (Ekins 1996). 
Primary benefits of climate protection measures arise with a delay of about a 
half-century, which is due to thermal inertia on our planet. This means that, in 
order to obtain primary benefits, some investment in climate policy has to be 
made which will only be paid back in an uncertain distant future. For decision-
makers the justification of investments in climate protection projects bringing 
about uncertain future benefits is a challenging task, which is exacerbated by 
the current financial crisis and high public debt levels.  
In contrast, ancillary benefits can be largely enjoyed (almost) instantly, since the 
avoided damages, e.g. from air pollution or noise, would have otherwise 
occurred immediately or shortly after the GHG emitting activity. Consequently, 
ancillary benefits constitute an immediate payback of investments, so that long 
periods for the amortization of any debts incurred in implementing the policy 
are prevented.  
 
3  The Basic Model 
3.1  Transboundary Pollution Spillovers 
We consider two countries, indexed by   in which private consumption 
generates a negative global spillover effects (GHG emissions) that harms all 
countries as well as negative domestic externalities in the shape of local 
emissions that exclusively affects the emitting country. 4
                                                        
4The case of one-sided spillovers has been analyzed by Rübbelke and Sheshinski (2005). 
 In country   a 
representative household’s production of both externalities accompanies its 
consumption of a polluting private good, which amounts to  . It also consumes 
a second (clean) private good of the amount  , which is not associated with any 
externality. It is assumed that households behave competitively, i.e., they ignore 
their own effect on total pollution. Furthermore, they take the other agents’ 
pollution levels as given. The global level of environmental externalities 8 
 
perceived in country   amounts to  where   
represents the total amount of the pollution-generating private good 
consumption in country 1 and   is the respective consumption in country 2. By 
means of the specific functional form of  we take into account that global 
environmental externalities are determined by the aggregated global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions caused by the consumption of the polluting 
private good. Such pollution is a perfect substitute among countries, i.e. it does 
not make a difference for either country where the GHG emission is produced. 
The domestic pollution in country   is represented by  . An eco-tax in 
the shape of an excise tax is levied which burdens the consumption of the 
polluting commodity.5
The Individual Household’s Maximization Problem 
 
 
The maximization problem of a representative household in country  can be 
expressed as follows: 
 




where  denotes the level of the representative household’s income,   denotes 
the excise tax rate,  stands for the tax funds raised from the 
representative household and  is the amount of tax funds   redistributed to 
others, such that  is the amount of tax funds which the representative 
household gets back from its government. It is assumed that the households are 
naive, i.e., they do not consider the effects of their behavior on   and  . This is 




                                                        
5“In the case of reciprocal consumption externalities, the common interpretation of the Pigouvian 
principle calls for taxes on the externality-creating commodities” (Green and Sheshinski 1976: 
798). 9 
 
We obtain the following first-order conditions: 
 
  (2) 
 
  (3) 
 
  (4) 
 
3.2  Take-it-or-leave-it Offer 
Regional welfare maximizing decision makers in country  do not take into 
account negative external effects they exert on their neighboring  country 
 and hence raise inefficiently low eco-taxes on the 
consumption of the dirty good X1. One method of coordinating environmental 
policy among regions to overcome inefficiently high transnational externality 
production is the implementation of a system of international side-payments. 
We assume that each country can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Country  , for 
example, could offer  , i.e. country   offers a transfer payment   which is 
channeled to country   in order to induce this country to raise its eco-tax rate   
to a certain level desired by  . Country   can either accept or reject the offer. We 
assume that both countries can make binding commitments with respect to 
their transfer payment and eco-tax levels. Local governments simultaneously 
offer take-it-or-leave-it contracts. In doing so, each country anticipates the 
subject matter  , with  , of the contract offered by the opponent. 
 
3.3  The First-best Policy 
As a reference scenario we examine the maximization problem of a social 
planner who maximizes global welfare in our two-country world, i.e. the sum of 
both countries’ welfare. We suppose that a country’s welfare level is equal to the 








Where   denotes the sum of national income  in country 1 and of 
national income   in country 2. The first-order conditions are: 
 
  (5) 
 
,  (6) 
 
where the third terms on the LHS of (5) and (6) respectively denote the 
marginal external effects of pollution. From equations (5) and (6) as well as 
equation (7) we obtain the Pareto-efficient tax rates: 
 




.  (8) 
 
The first-best optimal eco-tax policy   fully internalises local as well as 
global pollution externalities. 
 
4  Decentralized Policy 
Let us turn to the case where individual countries voluntarily negotiate about 
international pollution abatement. Each individual country’s welfare is affected 
by pollution  . The pollution in turn depends on the consumption level in both 11 
 
countries, so that both countries will have incentives to offer a take-it-or-leave-it 
contract to their neighbor  in order to influence the eco-tax policy of the 
opponent. 
 
4.1  Relationship between Taxes and Transfers in Country 2 
The government of country 1 could benefit by inducing country 2 to raise an 
eco-tax. We suppose that country 1 will therefore provide a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer to country 2. However, in the case of reciprocal externalities –which we 
will focus on – country 2 also provides such an offer to its opponent. In order to 
fulfill the individual rationality condition no country should be better off by 
unilaterally rejecting the offer of its opponent. Let us consider the condition 
under which country 2 will accept the other country’s offer: 
 
,  (9) 
 
where   represents the sum of transfers received from country 1. The LHS of 
(9) denotes the welfare of country 2 if it accepts country 1’s offer  . In case 
of a rejection of the offer it raises an individual rational tax  , which goes along 
with a national welfare level expressed by the RHS of (9). Accordingly, by (9) it 
is claimed that country 2 will only accept to raise a tax rate that is stipulated by 
the opponent player if its utility level after the introduction of the tax remains at 
least equal to the state in the case of rejection. Further, in equation (9) is the 
equilibrium amount of the polluting good consumed in country 2 and  is the 
respective amount of the second private good.  
Assuming that condition (9) holds with equality and total differentiating yields 
 
              (10) 
 12 
 
where  is the net income in country 2. When we take account of conditions (2) 
and (3) and the differentiation of the sum of all households’ budget constraints 
we can also write: 
   
 
Rearranging terms yields: 
 
.  (11) 
 
The amount of money which country 1 must at least pay to country 2 is uniquely 
determined by the choice of the tax rate  . In particular, it becomes obvious 
that the transfer payments   is an increasing function of   for all   . 
Analogously, we can derive the marginal impact of   on  . 
 
4.2  Transfer-paying Country 1’s Maximization Problem 
Countries 1 and 2, both intend to maximize national welfare by making take-it-
or-leave-it offers   and  , respectively. In the simultaneous-move 
game country 1 can correctly anticipate   offered by country 2 and vice 
versa.  
In the equilibrium  both countries will accept the offers of their opponents 
respectively so that we can restrict our analysis to the following maximization 
problem: 
 
    (12) 





  (13) 
In order to derive country 1’s optimal choice of t2, we insert (7) and (8) 
aggregated over all households in country 1 and the derivative of the budget 
constraint for  , which is  into (13). Then we obtain 
 
  (14) 
 
 
In the simultaneous move game country 2 in turn counterbids a contract to 
country 1 so that we can write the following system of equations: 
 
 





Inserting equation (11) the equivalent marginal effect for country 1 into the 
system of equations (15) shows that the two countries with reciprocal spillover-
effects can coordinate to play a first-best optimal eco-tax policy by a system of 
take-it-or-leave-it offers: 
 
  (16) 
 
  (17) 
 
In the proposed efficiency-generating scheme, transfers are financed by 
revenues raised from Pigouvian taxes, which are imposed within each country. 
Any excess tax revenue can be redistributed to households  using lump-sum 
transfers. However, not necessarily the revenues cover the required funds 
required for the transfers. In such a case the mechanism may not lead to a full 
internalization of the spillovers. 
 
5  Numerical Simulations for the Proposed Scheme 
5.1  Setting up the Problem 
The inclusion of ancillary benefits, which are private to a region or country, will 
raise the tax-income and therefore the funds available for transfers as long as 
the price elasticity of demand for consuming the polluting good is not very high. 
In order to analyse whether the proposed international negotiation scheme is 
viable, we employ a simulation model. In doing this we especially consider the 
influence which ancillary benefits have on the functionality of the scheme (see 
the Appendix for a survey on all relevant variables of the model).  
In line with the model of the previous section we consider a setting with two 
countries, producing two goods (X and Y), a clean good that generates no 
emissions and a dirty good that generates emissions. Abatement of GHG 
emissions  contributes to the global public good  , i.e. climate stabilization. 15 
 
Moreover, the abatement of sedentary emissions like noise and air pollution is a 
local public good due to its limited geographical sphere of influence. Hence, for 
notational simplicity without loss of generality we  maytake into account a 
modified welfare function depending on the provision of local as well as global 
public goods (respectively Q1 and Q2). Further we assume that there is a fixed 
amount of an input (L) that is allocated to the production of the two goods. The 
aim is to achieve an optimal level of provision of both X and Y and of the local 
public good Q1 in each country, as well as the optimal provision of the global 
public good Q2.  
 
5.1.1 Link between the local public good   and emissions   
First we consider the links between the public and private goods. The dirty 
private good   generates emissions   and  , while the clean private good   
generates no emissions. The higher the emissions  , the lower will be the 
amount of the local public good. We use the following specific form: 
 
  (18) 
 
with increasing emissions   the local public good supply declines at a 
decreasing rate, in line with empirical observations. The relationship between 
 and   is shown in Figure 2. 
 
5.1.2 Link between local emissions   and global emissions  
For simplicity we assume that local and global emissions are produced in 
constant proportion to each other: 
 
.  (19) 
 
5.1.3 Link between global emissions and the global public good   
The supply of the global public good declines if the total quantity of global 
emissions increases: 
 
.  (20) 16 
 
In analogy to the treatment of local public goods we consider a relationship 
between   and  with diminishing returns of abatement with the 





5.1.4 Links between   and the dirty private good   
The trade-off between the level of the emissions   and the amount of   is 










where ω is the share of the fixed resource allocated to the dirty private good. 
By equation (21) there are diminishing returns to   in terms of producing  . 
In this framework we can interpret local emissions   as an input to producing 
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Figure 2: Relationship between local emissions and Q1i17 
 
.  Further, there are also non-increasing returns to the use of production 
resources L. 
 
The function takes the form shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
5.1.5 Determinants of   
We assume that the supply of the clean private good  depends on the share of 








By equation (22) the underlying production function exhibits non-increasing 
returns to scale. 
 
5.1.6 The national welfare function 
We define the welfare function for each country as a linear-homogenous utility 
function given by: 
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Figure 3: Link Between local pollution and Xi
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The parameters   and   reflect the strength of preferences for the local and 
global public good in the country. For simplicity we assume that these 
preferences are the same for both countries.  
 
5.2  Determining Outputs: The Cournot-Nash (CN) Solution 
Basically, the CN solution is based on the assumption that each country is 
maximising its utility for a given strategy of the opponent player.  In this respect 
the welfare of each country is affected by the GHG-emissions  produced in the 
other country.  Each country’s decision can be reduced to choosing  . The first-
order conditions for the maximum are: 
 
  (24) 
 
.  (25) 
 
From (18) we can derive: 
 
  (26) 
 
and from (19) and (20) 
 
  (27) 
 
and from (21) we obtain 
 
.  (28) 
 
By substituting (26) – (28) into (24) and dividing by   we get: 
 19 
 
.  (29) 
 
From (21) we have 
 
  (30) 
 
and from (22) we obtain: 
 
 .  (31) 
 
Rearranging terms we can express the emission level in the Cournot-Nash game 
explicitly in closed form as: 
 
 .  (32) 
 
And similarly we can express the share of productive resources to   as 
 
  (33) 
 
where the superscripts   indicates that that is the Cournot-Nash solution. 
Note that the first order conditions may not give the maximum and we have 
possible non-concavities. Hence, we also need to consider the corner solution 
with no reductions in  :6
                                                        
6We can exclude the case of   as a possible solution as that would imply  , which would 




  (34) 
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5.3  Observations on the CN Solution  
a)  The greater is the cost of abatement of both the local and global public 
goods, in terms of the size of  ,  the higher will be the level of local 
emissions  and GHG emissions . This follows straightforwardly from 
equation (32). 
b)  By setting   equal  to zero we may represent the scenario where the 
provision of local public goods is not an issue. In that case the level of   
will be higher than if α  is positive. In other  words, the greater the 
importance that the local public good has in terms of preferences, the 
lower will be the selected level of local emissions, and since local and 
global emissions are linked, the lower will be the selected level of global 
emissions.  This can be derived from equation (32). 
c)  The allocation of productive resources to the polluting private good will be 
higher the greater is the preference for that good (the preferences for the 
polluting private good are measured by the parameter  ). This follows after 
some manipulation from equation (33). Likewise, the higher are the 
preferences for local and global public goods, the less will be allocated to 
the polluting private good.  Finally the greater is the value of  , the less we 
have diminishing returns in the production of the clean good and the more 
will be allocated to the production of that good. 
d)  The   solution will not emerge from a market equilibrium because 
private producers will not take account of the production of emissions that 
reduce the amounts of the local and global public good. It is easy to show 
that the level of   and  will be given by:7
 
  (35) 
 
 
under the   solution. 
However in the CN game countries can attain the CN solution if they levy a 
tax   on   as given by the expression below: 
 
 
                                                        
7The value of ‘s’ is still given by (33). 21 
 
  (36) 
 
where    is given by (33).8
5.4  Optimal Choices: The Global Solution 
 
For the global solution we seek to optimise  , where: 
 
.  (37) 
 
We now take account of the impact of   on the utility of country 2 and vice 
versa. If both countries are identical the optimal interior solution can now be 
shown to be: 
 
 .  (38) 
 
The superscript   stands for the optimal solution. A corner solution can again 
not be ruled out, so we must allow for the possibility that: 
 
 .  (39) 
 
Comparing (38) and (39) against (32) and (33) we can state that: 
 
.  (40) 
 
It can also be confirmed that the optimal value of s is the same as in the   
solution, i.e. it is given by (33). 
 
5.5  Some Numerical Results for Two Identical Countries 
Table 1 shows the results for plausible values of the parameters for two identical 
countries.  The main points to note are the following: 
                                                        




(i)  Corner solutions (when the reductions in   and  are zero) do not arise 
in the Cournot Case.  For the parameters investigated this is never the 
case. 
(ii)  Increases in the value of  (the preference for the impure public good) 
increase the   as well as the optimal level of reduction, as do increases in 
the value of β (the preference for the pure global public good). 
(iii)  Reductions in output relative to the maximum possible output are of the 
order of 30% in the   case and of the order of one percent more in the 
optimal case. 
(iv)  Increases in   (the rate at which the quality of the local environment 
declines with increases in local emissions) and   (the rate at which the 
quality of the global environment declines with increases in global 
emissions) result in an increase in the reduction in the both local and 
global emissions. The results are quite sensitive to these parameters. 
 
Table 1:  Numerical Values for the Two-Country Impure Public Good Model 
 
Variation in α and β 
 
Variation in v 
 
Variation in   and   
  0  0.025  0.05  0.025 
 
0.025  0.025 
 
0.025  0.025  0.025  0.025 
 
0.02
5  0.025  0.025  0.05 
 
0.025  0.025 
 
0.025  0.025  0.025  0.025 
  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
 
0.4  0.4 
 
0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8 
 
0.8  0.8 
 
0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8 
  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8 
 
0.8  0.8 
 
0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8 
  1  1  1  1 
 
1  1 
 
2  0.5  1  1 
  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
 
0.75  0.75 
 
0.75  0.75  2  0.25 
 
0.02
5  0.025  0.025  0.025 
 
0.04  0.05 
 
0.025  0.025  0.025  0.025 
 Solution 
                        % Red. In   -47%  -77%  -85%  -84% 
 
-63%  -54% 
 
-85%  -68%  -87%  -68% 
% Red. in    -47%  -77%  -85%  -84% 
 
-63%  -54% 
 
-65%  -24%  -68%  -24% 
% Red. in    -31%  -32%  -32%  -32% 
 
-32%  -32% 
 
-33%  -31%  -33%  -31% 
Optimal 
Solution 
                        % Red. in    -73%  -84%  -89%  -90% 
 
-74%  -68% 
 
-89%  -80%  -92%  -73% 
% Red. in    -73%  -84%  -89%  -90% 
 
-74%  -68% 
 
-89%  -80%  -92%  -73% 
% Red. in    -32%  -32%  -32%  -32%     -33%  -33%     -33%  -32%  -34%  -32% 
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5.6  Introducing a Tax to Emulate the Optimal Solution When 
Behaviour is Cournot Nash 
In this section we consider the introduction of a tax on  (alternatively, a tax 
on  may be raised which would have the same impact since the two pollutants 
are in fixed proportions). The tax is paid to the other country or to an 
international body.  In return the first country receives a payment from the 
taxes collected in the second country or collected internationally. 
The first thing to note is that an ad valorem tax on output will not have an 
impact on the   solution. The first order conditions do not change if the 
country maximises utility with net income defined as: 
 
  (41) 
 
where   is the net income and   is the tax rate. The tax that will modify 
behaviour is on emissions so that net income in units of   is defined as: 
 
,  (42) 
 
where   is the unit tax on emissions  . For such a tax the first-order 
conditions for an interior solution are given by 
 
.  (43) 
 
When   is zero this collapses to (29), giving the solution as expressed in (32).  
Equation (43) is shown graphically in Figure 4. The LHS declines with   and 








Figure 4:  A tax on the polluting private good  
 
The level of t cannot be determined in closed form. Any country will only accept 
the proposed tax policy if it goes along with a higher level of welfare than the 
one in the CN solution. We can confirm that if the countries are identical and if 
the tax is fully recycled, so that lump sum receipts are equal to payments made, 
then the welfare with the tax will indeed be equal to that at the global optimum 
and that is higher than welfare at the   solution. 
Simulations results are given in Table 2 for the tax rates that bring the   
solution to the optimal one. The tax rate is expressed in terms of the price of 
output being one. Hence it can be stated as a percentage rate on the output of  . 
 
Table 2:  Tax Rates on Global Pollutant That Take CN Solution to the Optimal 
One 
   Variation in   and    Variation in    Variation in   and   
α  0  0.025  0.05  0.025  0.025  0.025  0.025  0.025  0.025  0.025 
β  0.025  0.025  0.025  0.05  0.025  0.025  0.025  0.025  0.025  0.025 
k1  1  1  1  1  1  1  2  0.5  1  1 
k2  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  2  0.25 
ν  0.025  0.025  0.025  0.025  0.04  0.05  0.025  0.025  0.025  0.025 





We may derive the following statements form the solutions of Table 2: 
a)  The tax rates on the local pollutant are in the range of one to five percent of 
the output of the dirty good. 
b)  In the case of no impure public good problem (α=0), the tax rate is lower 
than when there is a public good problem (all else being equal). But the 
additional impact is not large and increases in αfrom 0.025 to 0.05 do not 
generate any appreciable increase in the tax rate. 
c)  Taxes rates do go up sharply when β  increases: from 0.025 to 0.05 
increases the rate from 2% to 4%. Recall that β  is a measure of  the 
preference for the global public good. 
d)  Variations in v, the marginal cost of abatement of the local public good, do 
not appear to change this tax rate appreciably. 
e)  Variations in k2 (the rate at which increases in emissions reduce the global 
public good) have a major impact on the tax rate.  Reducing the value of k2 
from 0.75 to 0.25 reduces the tax rate from 2.3% to 0.7% and rising the 
value to 2.0 increases the tax rate from 2% to 6%. 
Recapitulating, the analysis has shown that the presence of both local and global 
public goods yields a Cournot-Nash solution as well as a global solution in which 
the presence of the local public good does have an impact. If we want to go from 
the CN to global optima, a tax on the global pollutant is one way of getting there. 
The lump-sum repayment outweighs this tax burden and as long as countries 
are identical we can show that the tax revenue is sufficient to guarantee that the 
welfare level with the tax and repayment is equal to that of the global optimum 
(and higher than that of the CN solution). 
 
6  Concluding Remarks 
Ancillary benefits are an important benefit category associated with climate 
policy (Pearce 2000). Therefore, their influence on current international efforts 
should be carefully assessed. In a scheme combining Pigouvian taxes and side-
payments, we investigate how ancillary benefits might influence the outcome of 
negotiations.  26 
 
Ancillary benefits imply a higher attractiveness of climate policy, generating 
higher demands for such policies and consequently justifying  higher 
environmental tax rates in the considered tax-transfer scheme. Since the 
international side-payments are financed via the environmental taxation, more 
financial scope for transfers and room for manoeuvre are present. Yet, as the 
numerical simulation results for identical agents demonstrated, the 
international tax-transfer system to attain an efficient climate stabilisation level 
will even largely work in a proper way when ancillary effects are disregarded. 
The change from the Nash equilibrium to a Pareto-optimal outcome raises 
global welfare and hence there are surpluses, which suffice to attain an outcome 
where no country suffers from the scheme. In order to reach this outcome, the 
surpluses, however, have to be redistributed via the transfers-scheme.  
As we found in our simulation model, ancillary effects tend to justify only 
moderately higher tax rates and therefore the additional tax income available 
for international transfers does not increase significantly. However, if we take 
into account not only environmental co-benefits like improved air-pollution and 
lower noise levels, but also, e.g., a rise in energy security due to a higher supply 
of domestic renewable energy use, the ancillary benefits might gain further 
weight. As Gupta (2010: 645) points out considering past international climate 
policy, energy security is even a more dominant issue than climate change.  
Yet, if we take into account that the primary benefits are uncertain and are 
largely not enjoyed by current generations, there is some political reluctance to 
invest in climate policy. The difficulty for decision-makers to justify investments 
in climate protection projects bringing about uncertain future benefits is a 
challenging task by itself, but the high public debt levels faced in many countries 
exacerbate it. In contrast to primary benefits, ancillary benefits constitute an 
immediate payback of investments, so that long-term periods for amortization 
of debts are prevented. Investment benefits materialize immediately, since cost, 
e.g. from noise and local air pollution, for the climate protecting country are 
prevented in the present.  
Whether the use of discount factors is an appropriate way to reflect the high 
relevance of ancillary benefits for policy making is hard to say and there is much 
dispute about this (see, e.g. Schelling 1995). Furthermore, some of those 27 
 
countries facing serious financial trouble recently even had problems in 
receiving sufficient loans at all. For such countries a long-term period for the 
amortization of investments in climate policy will probably be unacceptable.     
Therefore, although ancillary benefits might be moderate compared to primary 
benefits, they may have an important impact on governments’ readiness to 
invest in climate policy. Overall benefits from such investments start flow 
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Variable  Definition 
  Quantity of emissions produced by country 1 which only affect country 1 
  Quantity of the emissions produced by country 1, which have a global effect. 
  Output of the ‘dirty’ private good produced by country 1 
  Output of the ‘clean’ private good produced by country 1 
  Share of production resources allocated to production of the ‘dirty’ good X1 in 
country 1 
  Share of production resources allocated to production of the ‘clean’ good Y1 in 
country 1 
  Share of production resources allocated to production of the ‘dirty’ good X2 in 
country 2 
  Share of production resources allocated to production of the ‘clean’ good Y2 in 
country 2 
  Quantity of emissions produced by country 2 which only affect country 2 
  Quantity of the emissions produced by country 2, which have a global effect 
  Output of the ‘dirty’ private good produced by country 2 
  Output of the ‘clean’ private good produced by country 2 
  Quantity of the local public good, available to country 1   
  Quantity of the local public good, available to country 2   
  Quantity of the global public good available to both countries 1 and 2 
  Total quantity of productive resources available in country 1 
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